Are There Any Hopes for the End of Karabakh Conflict?

17 October 2020 | 08:15 Code : 1996324 General category
By Ali Mousavi Khalkhali.
Are There Any Hopes for the End of Karabakh Conflict?

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has drawn in multiple players, including Iran. So far, Tehran has strived to keep neutral in the conflict. It is neighbor to both Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan, and holds friendly relations with both. In its current precarious position, facing extreme pressures from Washington, Tehran has no intention to sacrifice its friendly relations with its neighbors.

For its part, Tehran acknowledges the occupation by Armenia of seven cities that belong to the Republic of Azerbaijan, and supports Baku’s sovereignty over Nagorno-Karabakh. However, Tehran views with suspicion claims by other interested parties, and doubts the motives of other regional and extra-regional players, assuming that they are exploiting the conflict to advance their own regional and international agenda. Let’s cast a look at the motive of parties to the conflict.

Republic of Azerbaijan

Azerbaijan’s motives are numerous in the conflict. First of all, it rightly assumes sovereignty over its territories occupied by Armenia. Baku’s perception of its military strength to recapture its land has changed in the recent years, thanks to its heavy investment in arms deals. The issue is also a matter of national dignity, and failure to liberate the occupied territories is a source of embarrassment for Baku rulers. Rumors about Azeri President Ilham Aliyev’s illness and his decision to transfer power to his wife Mehriban Aliyeva, seem to have prompted Baku to wrap up the complicated Karabakh affair before any transition of power.

Armenia

Armenia is struggling with its own domestic infighting. Karabakh Armenians have a strong voice in the government, and are adamant in retaining the Nagorno-Karabakh region. They flex their power through close relations with Moscow and use Russia’s weight to carry out their agenda in Yerevan. The internal rift in Armenia has turned the Karabakh conflict into a complex story for the country.

Russia

For Russia, the permanent strategic goal is to fend off away foreign, particularly Western, powers from its strategic periphery regions. From East Asia, to the Korean Peninsula, to Eastern Europe, Russia has strived hard to keep its sphere of influence clear from any rivals. Ilham Aliyev’s pro-West inclinations that aim to consolidate his position in power, are not viewed as happy events by Moscow. Kremlin is also suspicious of the close relation between Turkey and Azerbaijan despite cultural and linguistic affinities between the two countries which makes friendship a natural choice.

Since the rise of Nikol Pashinyan to power, his pro-West tendencies have upset the Russians, who hold several military bases in Armenia and whose political, security, and military presence in Armenia runs deep.

The two recent skirmishes in Karabakh are opportunities for Russia to flex its muscles for Armenia and Azerbaijan, both parts of the country’s self-defined zone of influence. Russia has faked indifference, but also threatened and mediated between the two parties, without placing any significant pressure on either party to end the war.

Turkey

Many analysts have reminded that if the first Armenia-Azerbaijan skirmish, around three months ago, was intrigued by Russia, it was Turkey who galvanized Azerbaijan to start the second round of the conflict. Ankara even directly became involved in the fight. While Ankara has denied Yerevan’s claim of shooting down an Armenia Sukhoi fighter, there are evidence of Turkey dispatching Al Nusra terrorists from Syria to Karabakh to fight against Armenians. Behind this risky move, one senses a larger plot which can’t be easily ignored.

Turkey is currently heavily engaged in three battlefronts: in the Mediterranean Sea against Egypt and Greece over marine boundaries, in Idlib, Syria, against the Russians, and against Western countries and Moscow in Libya. Turkey’s military incursions into Iraq will eventually trigger another fight against Iraq and the international community. Relations between the White House and Ankara are also not as friendly as before, but Ankara believes opening a new front in Karabakh will help it defuse tension in other conflicts. That can explain why Turkey is investing in Azeris’ sensitivities, fanning pan-Turkic nationalism in the country, and trying to make Azerbaijan dependent on itself by lending Baku support in its fight against Armenia.

United States

So far, there are no definitive signs of Washington’s active engagement in the conflict. However, the Armenian side believes Washington knew beforehand about the outbreak of a new round of clashes, as it warned American citizens not to visit the border region between Azerbaijan and Armenia. White House has so far not taken any action to stop the armed conflict. Some analysts believe Washington is hand in hand with Turkey, aiming to pressure Iran and Russia, but there is no persuasive evidence for that. One thing is sure, and that is Washington is engrossed with the upcoming presidential election and is less concentrated on an extra-regional skirmish.

Iran

Iran views any tension in any of its borders as a threat against its security. That is why it has called for immediate halt to the clashes in its northern borders. In the meantime, Tehran is well-aware of machinations to stir ethnic tensions inside Iran. The large Iranian Azeri community supports Azerbaijan in the conflict, while the fractional Armenian ethnic minority, and Iranian Kurds are traditionally supportive of Armenians. Iran is trying to manage the public opinion in its northern and northwestern region in such a way to preclude any reactions stemming from ethnic sentiments, Azerbaijan and Turkey are trying to stir such sentiments inside the Iranian borders through promotion of pan-Turkist ideas, in order to force Iran back Baku in the conflict.

However, Iran is aware that the Karabakh conflict is not a tension only between Baku and Yerevan, and involves other actors such as Russia, Iran’s partner of convenience in international affairs. Turkey’s deployment of Salafist terrorists in Azerbaijan has also raised Tehran’s ire. Let’s not forget that Baku has also sided with Israel, Iran’s archenemy, despite Tehran’s consistent support for its northern Azeri neighbor.

All in all, Iran has insisted on immediate stop to the tensions in Nagorno-Karabakh, and has put forth solutions to end the conflict, which have received no clear response from Baku. An end to the Karabakh conflict in near future is unlikely, since neither the parties involved, nor global powers, or the international community have shown any resolution to end the saga.

* Ali Mousavi Khalkhali is editor-in-chief of Iranian Diplomacy.

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has drawn in multiple players, including Iran. So far, Tehran has strived to keep neutral in the conflict. It is neighbor to both Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan, and holds friendly relations with both. In its current precarious position, facing extreme pressures from Washington, Tehran has no intention to sacrifice its friendly relations with its neighbors.

For its part, Tehran acknowledges the occupation by Armenia of seven cities that belong to the Republic of Azerbaijan, and supports Baku’s sovereignty over Nagorno-Karabakh. However, Tehran views with suspicion claims by other interested parties, and doubts the motives of other regional and extra-regional players, assuming that they are exploiting the conflict to advance their own regional and international agenda. Let’s cast a look at the motive of parties to the conflict.

Republic of Azerbaijan

Azerbaijan’s motives are numerous in the conflict. First of all, it rightly assumes sovereignty over its territories occupied by Armenia. Baku’s perception of its military strength to recapture its land has changed in the recent years, thanks to its heavy investment in arms deals. The issue is also a matter of national dignity, and failure to liberate the occupied territories is a source of embarrassment for Baku rulers. Rumors about Azeri President Ilham Aliyev’s illness and his decision to transfer power to his wife Mehriban Aliyeva, seem to have prompted Baku to wrap up the complicated Karabakh affair before any transition of power.

Armenia

Armenia is struggling with its own domestic infighting. Karabakh Armenians have a strong voice in the government, and are adamant in retaining the Nagorno-Karabakh region. They flex their power through close relations with Moscow and use Russia’s weight to carry out their agenda in Yerevan. The internal rift in Armenia has turned the Karabakh conflict into a complex story for the country.

Russia

For Russia, the permanent strategic goal is to fend off away foreign, particularly Western, powers from its strategic periphery regions. From East Asia, to the Korean Peninsula, to Eastern Europe, Russia has strived hard to keep its sphere of influence clear from any rivals. Ilham Aliyev’s pro-West inclinations that aim to consolidate his position in power, are not viewed as happy events by Moscow. Kremlin is also suspicious of the close relation between Turkey and Azerbaijan despite cultural and linguistic affinities between the two countries which makes friendship a natural choice.

Since the rise of Nikol Pashinyan to power, his pro-West tendencies have upset the Russians, who hold several military bases in Armenia and whose political, security, and military presence in Armenia runs deep.

The two recent skirmishes in Karabakh are opportunities for Russia to flex its muscles for Armenia and Azerbaijan, both parts of the country’s self-defined zone of influence. Russia has faked indifference, but also threatened and mediated between the two parties, without placing any significant pressure on either party to end the war.

Turkey

Many analysts have reminded that if the first Armenia-Azerbaijan skirmish, around three months ago, was intrigued by Russia, it was Turkey who galvanized Azerbaijan to start the second round of the conflict. Ankara even directly became involved in the fight. While Ankara has denied Yerevan’s claim of shooting down an Armenia Sukhoi fighter, there are evidence of Turkey dispatching Al Nusra terrorists from Syria to Karabakh to fight against Armenians. Behind this risky move, one senses a larger plot which can’t be easily ignored.

Turkey is currently heavily engaged in three battlefronts: in the Mediterranean Sea against Egypt and Greece over marine boundaries, in Idlib, Syria, against the Russians, and against Western countries and Moscow in Libya. Turkey’s military incursions into Iraq will eventually trigger another fight against Iraq and the international community. Relations between the White House and Ankara are also not as friendly as before, but Ankara believes opening a new front in Karabakh will help it defuse tension in other conflicts. That can explain why Turkey is investing in Azeris’ sensitivities, fanning pan-Turkic nationalism in the country, and trying to make Azerbaijan dependent on itself by lending Baku support in its fight against Armenia.

United States

So far, there are no definitive signs of Washington’s active engagement in the conflict. However, the Armenian side believes Washington knew beforehand about the outbreak of a new round of clashes, as it warned American citizens not to visit the border region between Azerbaijan and Armenia. White House has so far not taken any action to stop the armed conflict. Some analysts believe Washington is hand in hand with Turkey, aiming to pressure Iran and Russia, but there is no persuasive evidence for that. One thing is sure, and that is Washington is engrossed with the upcoming presidential election and is less concentrated on an extra-regional skirmish.

Iran

Iran views any tension in any of its borders as a threat against its security. That is why it has called for immediate halt to the clashes in its northern borders. In the meantime, Tehran is well-aware of machinations to stir ethnic tensions inside Iran. The large Iranian Azeri community supports Azerbaijan in the conflict, while the fractional Armenian ethnic minority, and Iranian Kurds are traditionally supportive of Armenians. Iran is trying to manage the public opinion in its northern and northwestern region in such a way to preclude any reactions stemming from ethnic sentiments, Azerbaijan and Turkey are trying to stir such sentiments inside the Iranian borders through promotion of pan-Turkist ideas, in order to force Iran back Baku in the conflict.

However, Iran is aware that the Karabakh conflict is not a tension only between Baku and Yerevan, and involves other actors such as Russia, Iran’s partner of convenience in international affairs. Turkey’s deployment of Salafist terrorists in Azerbaijan has also raised Tehran’s ire. Let’s not forget that Baku has also sided with Israel, Iran’s archenemy, despite Tehran’s consistent support for its northern Azeri neighbor.

All in all, Iran has insisted on immediate stop to the tensions in Nagorno-Karabakh, and has put forth solutions to end the conflict, which have received no clear response from Baku. An end to the Karabakh conflict in near future is unlikely, since neither the parties involved, nor global powers, or the international community have shown any resolution to end the saga.

* Ali Mousavi Khalkhali is editor-in-chief of Iranian Diplomacy.