It’s a Time to Respect Democracy

IRD: How would you analyze the nature of the current uprisings in the Arab world?

HK: The uprisings in the Arab world are like old wounds, which many analysts were aware of. Even though the motivations behind them are similar, they differ in important details of circumstances and motivations, specific to each individual country.

IRD: How do movements for freedom and democracy in the Arab world differ from those in Iran in terms of their timing, quality, and the direction of their political demands?

HK: We should of course remember that the Arab world is not an integrated or uniform one. Take Egypt as an example; it not only has an ancient civilization but its modern political movements go back to second half of the 19^th century; which is very similar to Iran. Egypt’s historical political system has been an autocratic one. While implementing local characteristics, this system was under the rein of the monarchy-autocratic empire of Ottomans.

Since the late 19^th century when Egypt was practically transformed into a semi-colonial country, the autocratic regime has gradually softened its grip, allowing intellectuals and the elite to work on gaining political independence, modernity, and occasionally Islamic modernity as well. The dictatorship of Jamal Abdul Nasser, established 60 years ago, brought independence to Egypt. Although he had a strong popular base, liberals, communists, and Islamists opposed him. The dictatorship of Anwar Sadat, which replaced Nasser, was not very popular either, and the dictatorship of Hosni Mubarak that came after Sadat was detested by the Egyptian people, at least in the last few years.

Iranian movements after the second half of the 19^th century were trying to eliminate tyranny and deploy a lawful government in order to achieve modernity. Surely, the rule of law is not necessarily democratic, but some constitutionalists were proponents of democracy as well. As a result, the constitution designed by the constitutionalists included the foundations of a democratic system in and of itself. However, as sayings go, instead of achieving democracy, the country became a scene of historical chaos. This brought about dictatorship, a return of tyranny; and later the Second World War, the National Movement (the main aim of which was achieving democracy and independence), and the 1953 coup, all resulting in dictatorship between the years 1954 and 1964, which left the country in despotism up until 1979. Later, we had the Islamic revolution and the events that followed.…

To sum up, I have to say that uprisings in these countries- not only Egypt and Iran- all demand complete independence, the rule of law, freedom, and democracy. However, regardless of the motivations and the measures taken by the dictators, the societies were not ready to implement modern political regimes.

IRD: Are the Arab societies also caught up in the historical cycle of tyranny-chaos-tyranny?

HK: I am not sure of the details in order to answer this question. However, what is certain is that historical systems ruling in these countries differed drastically from systems ruling Europe. But yes, tyranny and chaos were prevalent in their histories as well.

IRD: How probable do you think it is that after toppling the undemocratic Mubarak regime Egypt will reproduce an authoritarian political structure? What factors do you think can lead to this situation?

HK: I am not sure about despotism, but the probability of a dictator regime taking over the status quo is high. And one of the main reasons behind this is the political statism existing in society. In other words, some might consider democracy an equivalent to chaos and disorder, in which they find a chance to set the stage for proponents of dictatorship, who are still a big force.

IRD: How high do you see the probability of Islamic governments in Egypt and Tunisia? What are the main motivations and obstacles to the establishment of such governments?

HK: This depends on the political power of domestic forces and influential external forces. In addition, many Islamists in these countries say they believe in political pluralism even if as in Turkey, they themselves have religious commitments. 

IRD: What is the relation between the vast and exposed violence used by Gaddafi and policy-making traditions in the Arab world?

HK: Social and political development in Libya is very immature compared to other Arab countries. And this influences how Gaddafi is cracking down on his people. But we should bear in mind the genocide committed by Hafez Assad 30 years ago; or the Ba’ath and Saddam Hussein regimes, or what Saddam did in Halabcha.

IRD: Is Western interference in the recent changes in the Arab world going to lead to the formation of democratic countries?

HK: Well, supposing that these interferences are meant to bring democracy to these countries, my main concern as a historian and social analyst is the level of preparedness and development existing in these societies.

IRD: In contemporary political history terms, what were the most important social forces at play in Arab countries, and in Egypt in particular?

HK: During the last three decades, the most important social classes making up these countries were the middle classes (including traditional and modern). Peasants constitute the largest class in Egypt, but they do not have a very strong political voice.

IRD: What is your prediction about the future of the current changes happening in the Middle East and the Arab world?

HK: I have to go back to the issue of preparedness and development again. If a large number of the middle class and important political factions of these countries are prepared for “the game”; meaning being prepared for plurality, moderation and tolerance, a readiness to engage in compromise, maintaining social discipline, and to stop reaching for inaccessible ambitions; then political development leading to democracy can be achieved. We have to remember that democracy is not a static project, rather, it is a dynamic process.