Turkey, the Winner of the Aimless Istanbul Talks

05 April 2011 | 22:04 Code : 10842 General category
By Dr. Ali Bigdeli
Turkey, the Winner of the Aimless Istanbul Talks
IRD: In the political sciences, it is said that the value of each country is equal to the influence it has in the international arena. In other words, each country has as much value inasmuch as it can influence international developments. Therefore, we haven’t been able to find our value according to this framework because we haven’t been able to turn into an influential player in the international scene. Although we do have the means to become an influential player, our weak diplomatic skills and inappropriate politics have prevented us from realizing that role. If we accept this definition, then we have to say that we had no role in the international scene last year.

So, to assess the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy in the previous year I have to say that we were not very active in our foreign policy except in some cases revolving around our own regional policies, such as our role in the elections in Lebanon and Iraq, and the formation of the Iraqi government. However, on the international level we were passive because our nuclear dossier had spread its shadow over our foreign policy. Last year, we were not invited to some international events like the Davos Forum, which confirms our passivity in foreign policy.

Perhaps the most important event in Iran’s foreign policy and its nuclear dossier was the 5+1 negotiations with Iran in Istanbul. As an Iranian civilian, I didn’t agree with our insistence in participating in the Istanbul conference, because in reality it was Turkey that benefited most from this event. Through this conference, Turkey was able to prove to the European Union that it was an influential country in the Middle East. Therefore, it seems like this conference had more benefits for Turkey than Iran.

This conference was held with no clear plan or agenda, and in practice had no advantage for Iran. The conference had no significant role in Iran’s negotiations with the 5+1 group about its nuclear dossier, and Mrs. Ashton, the EU negotiator, implicitly noted that they would not consider this conference in the process of their talks. Therefore, the Istanbul conference had no influence in improving or creating more transparency in Iran’s nuclear file. Since it was predicted before hand that this conference would have no clear outcome, holding this conference was an outstanding bonus that we offered Turkey. 

The conference ended in favor of Turkey because it enabled it to show off its power to the European Union, so that the EU might agree with its membership in the union. This conference not only had no benefit for Iran’s talks with the West, but only days after the conference Mrs. Ashton announced that they would not negotiate with Iran unless the preconditions were removed, in other words negotiations would only take place without precondition constraints.

These words were too strong for Iran, and they made the possibility of future negotiations more difficult. Iran has proposed further talks on many other occasions but they have all been rejected by the West and the European Union, because even the 5+1 is now concerned that these negotiations have turned into an option for killing time and repeating the same words on the Iranian side. Therefore, the possibility of holding another conference like previous ones is perhaps somewhat far-fetched at this point.

The recent developments in the Middle East and North African countries have distracted the West’s attention from Iran’s nuclear dossier to some extent, which might actually benefit us. But I don’t think that this can completely solve the problem, and I believe that we will face serious challenges by remaining in this situation. Therefore, we have to come up with changes in our foreign policy and hone our negotiation skills as well. The current situation, in which we continue with out any agenda or preconceived plan, is definitely not to our advantage.

However, if we refer to history and more specifically to the nationalization of Iranian oil, we will understand that one of the reasons behind Mosadegh’s failure was the prolongation of the negotiations. To wit, the negotiations lasted from 1951 when Mosadegh became vice premier up until August 19th 1953, when he was ousted from power. The prolonged negotiations exhausted the people, the Americans, and the British. I sometimes think that Mosadegh might have had no other choice- and he might have even welcomed what we call the coup- because it could provide him the chance to escape from that complex situation.

Therefore, I recommend that the President come up with a solution to this problem, because prolonged negotiations and the failure to achieve any solution could fatigue the people. This uncertainty will create many problems for us. It seems like the people, the system, and the international community are all getting tired of this process. I believe that we have to come up with changes in our negotiation style in the coming year so that we can achieve a part of our national interest, which is buried between incomplete negotiations.