11th sep for the Foreign Ministry of Iran’s Reformist Government
In the hectic and eventful Asian Department of the Foreign Ministry, 11th of September 2001 was one of the most tense and hectic days. Officials were still in shock by the surprising assassination of Ahmad Shah Masoud, the leader of Afghan Mujahedin, and were trying to mitigate the losses of this trauma. 2 days before on 9th of September, Ahmad Shah Masoud was assassinated by an astounding act of terrorism.
On that day two TV reporters who were Tunisian subjects and had stayed at Ahmad Shah Masoud’s controlled areas since 10 days before interviewing his friends and fellow fighters, managed to meet Masoud.
In the first minutes of the meeting they assassinated him in a suicidal attack by activating the explosives planted in their video cameras. This operation was professionally planned outside Afghanistan and the performers had spent considerable time to achieve it, knowing about the value and importance of their crime. All evidence showed that the operation had been planned outside Afghanistan and its masterminds harbored more goals.
In these conditions, the officials concerned in the problem tried firstly to provide the required advice for Afghan Mujahedin in the bitter post-Masoud situation and give them intellectual aid to reconstruct their organization and secondly, to study the outcome of this event in Afghanistan and the region and revise the strategy of dealing with Afghanistan according to the new situation.
In their initial analyses, Ministry of Intelligence and Revolutionary Guards (Sepah) believed that Ahmad Shah Masoud has been assassinated by Al-Qaeda and they predicted other important events are on their way.
On the evening of 11th of September I was reading the official reports and correspondences when colleagues informed me that a great terrorist attack in New York has taken place and has become the spotlight of all TV channels.
I turned on the TV where The CNN reporter was reporting lively from a building across the World Trade Center. Moments later, in front of TV cameras a second airplane hit the building and set it on fire. Two days after Masoud’s assassination, another terrorist attack, much more important and shocking, had happened; an attack that would change lots of things throughout the world.
For the ones working on Afghanistan problem who wanted to know the reason of Masoud’s assassination, it was not difficult to see the link between these two suicidal attacks.
The connection verified that both operations have been planned by one mastermind, likely to be Al-Qaeda. Other information also made this speculation more a possibility. The link between these issues with Al-Qaeda and Iran’s eastern neighbors were all main reasons for the Asian Department of Foreign Ministry to get involved with the crisis. But there were also more important reasons at those days.
The Minister of Foreign Affairs had traveled abroad and in the early months of the second period of Reform Era –under the sixth parliament’s pressure-, during the minister’s absence his deputy should take over his responsibility and this was one of those days in that short period.
Soon enough, discussions started. The Foreign Ministry had to make the final decision in a few hours before midnight and deliver its suggestion on the manner of reacting to this crime, so that the senior officials of the country could decide about it. Naturally the first question for any decision had to be about the nature of this event.
And to find an answer to this question several answers for several questions had to be found. What is the nature of the event? Who has committed this crime? If Al-Qaeda has been the agent of this operation, how has it accessed such facilities in United States, and with whose help? Does this event concern the internal conflicts of United States too or it has been totally directed by outsiders?
If there were evidence showing the intention of Al-Qaeda’s leader to launch such an attack, why have they been neglected by United States?
If it has undertaken the operation, has Al-Qaeda been clandestinely directed by American and Israeli radicals? Is it possible that penetrators have directed the group towards an operation desired by American and Israeli extremists? What is the aftermath of this event? What aims do the agents of this crime follow?
Has it been only a blind terrorist attack or its known and unknown undertakers follow specific goals? Which groups benefit and rejoice from this attack?
And questions such as that which most of them have remained unanswered after 5 years and may be so forever. The strong evidence intelligence officials had at hand on Al-Qaeda launching the attack didn’t answer the load of questions and ambiguities. Finding answer to all questions was important, but not useful for a 3-4 hour process of decision-making.
Politics, and foreign affairs as a part of it are complicated phenomena and in critical conditions the decision makers in this domain are not able to study all aspects of one problem and they face lack of sufficient information. But sometimes trying to look complicated at a problem may divert politicians from the simple, evident narration and make their condition worse.
For this reason it’s necessary that alongside all aspects, we don’t overlook the simple, evident version of international and political phenomena and think on it. That is more important in Iran where traditionally, the intellectuals are interested in projection and analyze every problem in the frame of conspiracy theory. Based on the evident, certain aspects of the event, President’s quick reaction was essential for these reasons:
1. In this terrorist attack, several thousand people who had no connection with their government had been killed by terrorists when there was no state of war. It was not important which people had launched this attack and what was their goal: the crime had to be condemned clearly and strongly.
2. In similar cases, Iran was accused by its adversaries. If it was necessary for all countries to condemn the attack, it was more necessary for Iran to do so, not only to express its stance clearly but to foil the propaganda of its adversaries by initiative and quick reaction.
3. Condemnation of the attack by Foreign Ministry was a correct move but it wasn’t enough. The President’s reaction, with his anti-violence, pacific ideas about the dialogue of civilizations and peace would be more conspicuous and it could thwart the propagandistic atmosphere against Iran.
Mr. Khatami was quickly informed about this conclusion and it was recommended that he expresses his stand quickly. We all knew that sooner or later the President would react strongly against this crime, but what we wanted was his quick reaction.
Less than one hour after the event Israeli leaders started their task. Barak and Netanyahu, former P.Ms of Israel were of the first political figures who allowed some time for analyzing this event. They were interviewed lively on international TV channels to represent the Israeli interpretation of this event.
In their idea, everything was crystal clear and the agents weren’t unknown. United States had to search among countries like Iran, Syria and Lebanon for the ones who had planned this terrorist attack.
Interestingly they avoided naming Afghanistan as a center of terrorism. They did not consider it as important and emphasized that this attack has been directed in other countries such as Iran.
The way Israel acted, while proving Foreign Ministry’s opinion, showed that radical adversaries of Iran throughout the world have got down to business very fast and aim to introduce their own analysis as the basis of all other analyses. To stop this propagandistic conspiracy, promptness was essential.
Since the President’s decision was not clear yet, media section staffs were asked to prepare two texts: one to be proposed to the President and another one as Foreign Ministry’s likely statement. Meanwhile, Dr. Khaniki, Deputy Minister of Higher Education and the President’s advisor whose writings were approved by the President, was asked to prepare a text that can be offered to the President.
He was told that Mr. Khatami has not decided yet whether or not to take a stand, but we had got no time and everything had to be ready to deliver him a text if he decided to take a stand on the issue.
In addition to Ministry colleagues, many friends, from President’s advisors to members of the cabinet and university professors stressed the necessity of Mr. Khatami’s quick reaction.
Some emphasized the humane aspect of the event and believed that for this very reason, as the promoter of dialogue between civilizations, Mr. Khatami should react before others and by this give a clear message to the international community in the year of dialogue between civilizations. Some pointed out to the biased propaganda of adversaries and believed that Iran’s lack of promptness could cause the formation of a propagandistic atmosphere against the country and we couldn’t be sure of reversing this course the next day.
All these people were requested to contact President or his office and express their opinion directly. In that critical situation, President asked for the opinion of his advisors and other experts, in addition to Foreign Ministry. Since there was no time for a meeting to sum up all ideas at that time of the night, transferring ideas in this way could help decision making.
On 8 p.m. President’s office announced that Mr. Khatami agrees with a prompt formal statement on condemnation of this crime.
But still it wasn’t clear if the President would take a stand himself or the Foreign Ministry had to take the responsibility. The ministry’s recommendation on this issue was asked. Also guidelines were issued for the content which made the task a little difficult. Ministry colleagues and Mr. Khaniki were informed about the guidelines.
The proposed texts became ready until 9 o’clock and finally Dr. Khaniki’s passage which was a very distinctive one was offered to Mr. Khatami. After three phone conversations with the President, the final version of the statement was prepared on 9.30 and President’s office published it. On 10 p.m. the news agencies published the statement and Iranian TV broadcasted it in 10.30.
President’s stand quickly stood at the top of the news of 9/11 terrorist attack and changed the propagandistic atmosphere for Iran in foreign media, including American media, sooner than it was expected. The statement continued to be effective in the following days.
Within 24 hours after the event all world leaders denounced this terrorist attack and no one could remain silent, but seldom had any of their statements the effect of Mr. Khatami’s.
There were no new topics in his statement which had not been mentioned before. The only point was that in an eloquent style, condolences were expressed to American citizens and terrorism was denounced, in any form, anywhere. No attention was paid to the United States government, but Iran’s prompt and timely decision to condemn the terrorist attack had a great impact.
In the following days, Mr. President was one of the main figures consulted by European countries and international organizations about the event and gradually he became known as an ally of the global community in war against Al-Qaeda terrorism. This continued until one year later when Israel and American extremists’ plot changed the tone of the U.S. President.
Definitely United States’ acceptable and conciliatory stance had several reasons. United States didn’t want to view the developments of the region from Israel’s point of view, especially when it had faced a serious security problem in its own territory.
Contacts between Iran and United States on Afghanistan had a great influence on this issue and in addition, intelligence analysis of United States showed that Iran and its allies in the region had no connection with Al-Qaeda terrorists. But despite all these, the timely, deliberate and prompt decision of Iran at the end of 11th of September had an important impact on crisis management.
9/11 was a crisis which could bring with itself serious threats against Iran, but ultimately it brought opportunities with itself for Iran and its national interests.