Carrots and Sticks for Pakistan

18 August 2010 | 19:12 Code : 8130 Editorial
To cease their support of the Taliban. By Pir-Mohammad Mollazehi
Carrots and Sticks for Pakistan
Hillary Clinton’s visit to Islamabad, more than a Pakistan-oriented trip, was an Afghanistan-oriented one. What is Pakistan’s role in Afghanistan? In fact, the policy the United States is following with respect to Pakistan is the old “carrots and sticks”, that is, encouraging the Pakistanis to fight against al Qaeda and the Taliban and to support Washington’s strategy in Afghanistan, while threatening the country when Islamabad acts as a maverick and insists on maintaining its ties with the two terrorist groups. Nonetheless, Pakistan’s struggle with the local Taliban –mainly consisting of Pashtuns- has made U.S. efforts less painstaking. Having come to the conclusion that Afghanistan’s Taliban cannot be separated from their brethren in Pakistan, Islamabad has now decided to act tougher towards the Afghan Taliban.

Regardless, the politicians in Islamabad are following their own line. They are not looking for further friction with extremists in their northern neighbor; rather, they advocate their integration into Afghanistan’s politics. If the U.S. shows determination in following the same policy, Pakistan may be assured that its interests are served. Afghanistan is regarded as ‘strategic depth’ by Islamabad, and Pakistan will never tolerate an anti-Islamabad (read: pro-New Delhi) government’s rise to power in Afghanistan.

It seems that Washington has also understood –though perhaps a little late- that as long as Pakistan’s interests in Afghanistan are disregarded, the war continues, or in an even worse scenario, may lead to the Taliban’s victory. Washington certainly does not wish to experience what its once archenemy the Soviet Union suffered three decades ago. In this context, Hillary Clinton’s promise of a 7-billion dollar aid package takes on new meaning. More tempting sweeteners are the under-deliverance of F16 fighters, and future-delivered F18s. Pressures on Islamabad will of course not be forgotten, as the carrot is useless without the stick.

Meanwhile, on July 18, 2010 and under U.S. pressure—in another step to convince Pakistan to abandon backstage support (and to solve the problem) of the Taliban—Pakistan and Afghanistan signed a trade pact. Pakistan should take a major role in Hamed Karzai’s ‘national reconciliation’ plan aimed at the integration of the Taliban into Afghan society.

* Pir-Mohammad Mollazehi is an expert in Indian Subcontinent affairs.