P5+1 to P5+2, Neither Desirable Nor Possible
December 11th, 2013 - by Hamed Shafiei
Iran’s nuclear negotiations with the West began in 2003. At that time, three European countries, Britain, France, and Germany, sat at the negotiating table with Iran and eventually, in 2006, Russia, the US, and China, joined the negotiations to form the EU3+3 or, with another name, the P5+1, meaning the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany. Recently, following the initial success of the latest round of nuclear negotiations in Geneva, some Arab countries, led by Saudi Arabia and Qatar, have proposed the participation of Arab countries of the region in the nuclear process. Iranian Diplomacy recently spoke with Sirous Nasseri, a former member of Iran’s Resolution 598 negotiating team and a senior member of Iran’s nuclear negotiating team during Hassan Rohani’s tenure as head of the Iranian National Security Council, about the history of Iran’s nuclear negotiations and the recent idea proposed by the Arab countries.
What is the historical process of the formation of the countries negotiating with Iran? How did the first three countries grow to 6 countries at the present time?
The issue of nuclear negotiations with Iran was proposed by the other party in 2002. In fact, before Iran began the process of making decisions about the method of negotiation and the parties, the three countries of Germany, France and Britain proposed, in a letter to Iran’s Foreign Minister at the time, Dr. Kharrazi, that if Iran implements a series of measures which are in accordance with the demands of the September 2003 resolution of the IAEA, then these three countries are ready to facilitate these measures. After studying the proposed letter, it was decided that a positive response would be given not to the context but to the negotiation itself with the three countries. Following this response, the three European foreign ministers came to Iran. Later, the Russian Foreign Minister also sent a letter to Mr. Kharrazi, the context of which was similar to that of the three Foreign Ministers. The question that was raised at that time was whether increasing the number of negotiating parties, meaning to include Russia and other countries, was good or not? Our conclusion was that our nuclear issue was an artificial dispute and the country that had globalized this issue and attempted to create a crisis was the US, thus, this issue should either have been resolved or disputed with the US. But at the same time negotiating with the US was not on the agenda. The collection of these elements led to the conclusion that negotiations should take place with the three European countries of Germany, France and Britain and Russia should constantly be informed of this process.
When Mr. Larijani was in charge of negotiations, there was the interpretation that the three European countries did not have the necessary political ability and capacity to implement the agreements made during negotiations. That is why the scope of the negotiating parties expanded so that this ability would be created. Again, since the presence of the main disputing party, i.e. the US, was not possible, it was decided that Russia and China would be added to the three European countries to become more capable of implementing the possible agreements. But, nonetheless, this problem remained unsolved.
Has there been a legal process for this composition or did the parties just agree to add new members?
There was no legal process. It is not that it was adopted somewhere that Iran’s nuclear issue must be negotiated with a special collection of countries. This process has gradually been formed in the long process of negotiations.
What are the consequences of the growing scope of the negotiating parties for Iran?
The point that the Islamic Republic of Iran should negotiate and reach an agreement with 5 or 6 countries to resolve an artificial crisis is not a proper method. This is while there might be some advantages for us from the aspect of the weight which the other party can add to negotiations and perhaps we could, to some extent, use the power of maneuver which is rooted in the scope of positions taken by the members of the other party, but in a general assessment, this issue would further complicate the negotiations.
Perhaps the second problem, which makes this task as difficult as the first one, is media propagation and the openness of negotiations.
Nevertheless, this is the process and the Islamic Republic of Iran must, within this framework and conditions, make efforts to achieve its objectives from these negotiations.
Is it your assessment that there is no benefit from this composition because of the presence of Russia and China? Practically, although Russia and China were members of this group, they only acted as mediators and consulters.
Russia and China might somehow play a role in the beginning stages of negotiations when general positions are taken, but when negotiations become serious and move in the direction of reaching an agreement over the context, then the words and then a text, the roles of these countries would become less highlighted, because they have no claims in these negotiations. These two countries are neither our full supporters nor the other party’s full supporters. Russia and China have good will and intend for the issues to be resolved peacefully and through a win-win game for both parties.
Mrs. Ashton is the representative of the European Union and is a member of the negotiating group of the EU. Why is the presence of the three European countries necessary when the EU representative attends these negotiations and vice versa? Especially when, according to your statement, the main party to this artificial dispute is the US and not the EU or the three countries of Germany, France and Britain.
This is right. If you remember, the whole Iranian nuclear issue was spread in the world by the US when the US was looking for an excuse to expand its presence in the Middle East. The US was proud of the initial results in Afghanistan and Iraq and had stated that it sought to pursue a similar policy in Iran, as the main country of the region. That is why this issue began with the adventurisms of the US neo-cons and created a heritage for the next administrations in the US. The fact that today the main accuser which makes these false accusations can talk with Iran, which is the oppressed party in this issue, to find a solution would somehow weaken the status and role of the countries which are present in the scene. But at the same time it is the path that has been taken and usually one does not restart a process which has already begun. Although faults could be found in this structure, it has already been formed and it has been seen that moving forward is possible even within this framework. I believe that so long as the two parties feel that this process is efficient, they would not seek a change in the structure. But if, from the beginning, it was supposed to negotiate based on the logic of discussion and negotiation, usually the two main disputing parties should negotiate with each other and the rest should only watch, and not the other way around. But this is what has been inherited.
Some state that the negotiations between Iran and the US move the nuclear issue forward, meaning that if Iran and the US reach an agreement, then other countries would also reach an agreement as well. Thus, some Arab states including Qatar and Saudi Arabia believe that the Geneva agreement has caused the US to succumb to Iran’s hegemonic demands in the region. Therefore, they propose the issue of their presence in the negotiating countries and state that the number of the P5+1 member countries must be turned into the P5+2. Their claim is that the Arab states have the right to be assured of the peacefulness of Iran’s nuclear activities more than the European and even Eastern Asian countries. How logical and acceptable is this demand?
In a first look, it may seem that this claim which is proposed by the collection of the Arab states, which I believe is led by Saudi Arabia, has a logic but a careful look at it raises numerous questions. Iran’s nuclear issue and the formation of the negotiating group were proposed ten years ago. If the intention of the regional countries or, at least, those countries which propose this matter, is that this issue is regional and not international, and that thus it must be discussed in the region, they should have proposed this issue a long time ago. These countries should have proposed this issue to the Islamic Republic of Iran at that time. It is the issue of the timing of this proposal that cannot politically be approved. Hence, this proposal is neither desirable nor possible and it seems to just be a propaganda measure.
Would the entrance of a new member lead to the creation of more gaps between the negotiating countries?
I believe that it would be impossible to add a new member. Therefore, we should not discuss an issue which seems impossible.
What could Iran’s logical reaction be to this issue and what confidence-building measures could Iran take against such a claim?
What Iran’s Foreign Minister is now doing by visiting the countries of the region and the visits made by the officials of the regional countries to Iran are the logical approach to this issue. In fact, the objective of Iran’s Foreign Minister behind these visits is to remind these countries that if an agreement is made with regard to the nuclear issue and a final agreement is reached, then this would be to the benefit of all countries of the region because the shadow of an artificial, yet significant, threat would be removed from the region and regional countries could solve other regional issues such as Syria with more calm.