The Future of Secularism in Tunisia

By: Mohammad Hajkarim Jabbari

October 23, 2011 will be recorded as a historic day for Tunisia and the rest of the world. Nine months after the fall of the Tunisian dictator Bin Ali, and amid doubts and speculations, the first transparent, multi-party election was held in this North African country. The enthusiasm and discipline governing the election shows the political and social vigilance and maturity of the Tunisian nation. The 90 percent turnout of registered voters speaks volumes.

Before the election, there were spoiler remarks suggesting a low turnout by the youth, who, interestingly, were the first ones to attend the ballot boxes. These are all signals indicating a solid social and intellectual base for the establishment of democracy in Tunisia, invalidating Orientalist remarks claiming that the intellectual, ideological and cultural structures of the Arab nations do not welcome democracy, but dictatorship.

Now the question for the Tunisian nation and the international community is the nature of the future political system with regard to the role of religion in its policy and governance, i.e., will secularism remain a building block of the constitution? Will the Islamists dominate the Constituent Assembly and rule the country according to Islamic rules? Can there be any reconciliation between Islamism and secularism? The question is thoughtful if one takes a look at the votes and viewpoints of various intellectual and ideological groups in Tunisia and the more than 80 parties that took part in the election. The coalitions formed among the Tunisian parties can be categorized in three major groups, i.e., the Islamists, conservative nationalists, and secularists. None of these parties highlighted secularism and separation of religion from politics, some even using the witty paradoxical phrase “Secularism? Insha’Allah (God Willing)!” The following reasons may explain secular parties’ avoidance of advocating purely secular rule in their electoral campaigns:

1-    All parties and groups -including the secularists- are well aware that a significant majority of the Tunisian society is persistent in its Islamic beliefs and may even float the idea of a religion-based establishment. After the fall of Bin Ali and abolition of forced secularism, a significant portion of Tunisian women turned to the hijab, while some criticize the Western-style appearance of the less religious women. While this does not essentially mean a shift towards a religious establishment, it bespeaks a massive embracement of religion. In comparison with major Tunisian cities and the upper and middle classes, this enthusiasm is stronger in the rural areas. Therefore, even the secularists do not want to lose a great part of the citizens’ support by pressing for separation of religion and politics.

2-    In 1990, banning the democratically elected Islamic Salvation Front from entering the parliament triggered a decade of violent, blood-soaked civil war in the country. Perhaps the West and Tunisian secularists have learned a few lessons from that era and do not want to experience the same destiny.

3-    During the time of Bin Ali, the Tunisian dictator was the one who decided what Islam had to be and how it should be enforced. Unlike Turkey, where secularism is rooted in the history, in Tunisia secularism was dictated in a top-down fashion. Even with democracy and secularism, Bin Ali’s method cannot be followed. The pro-secular forces must treat religion with care and appreciate its role in governing society.

As far as Islamists are concerned, Ennahda-- the oldest Islamist political party led by Rachid Ghannouchi-- has secured a plurality of seats in the Constituent Assembly, but is obliged to form a coalition with ideologically-cognate parties. This is the current situation for Tunisian Islamists:

1-    They have to face reality: the West looks with concern at the developments and pro-democracy movements of the Arab world and does not want the Arab Spring to turn into what some have tagged as an “Islamist Winter”. Islamists have learned some lessons from the marginalization of Islamists in Algeria, Sudan and Turkey (the short-lived Necmettin Erbakan cabinet). They are also aware that Salafists and radical Islamists are poised to take advantage of the existing ideological vacuum-- and they appreciate the diversity of the Tunisian society, especially its younger generation. They don’t want to instigate a domestic or international alliance against themselves.

2-    Is Ennahda’s current official line merely a tactical move, cast aside once they find the opportunity to establish a full-scale Islamist government? Or has their mentality has undergone a metamorphosis? The following arguments back up the second concept:

First, objective facts show that Ennahda could have had a stronger participation in the election and secure an absolute majority of seats. But it did not.

Second, considering the massive support for Ennahda-- which even intimidated secularists and discouraged them from chanting pro-secularism slogans-- it did not need to take the high road to call for an Islamic Constitution (as in Libya, where the head of the National Transition Council abolished all allegedly anti-Islam rules and regulations during his speech in Benghazi in celebration of the liberation of Libya). Not only did Ennahda not embark upon a campaign to achieve the absolute majority of the seats, but also promised not to pursue the establishment of an Islamic government. The unveiled women among Ennahda electoral candidates reveals the story.

Third, historic experiences, from the suppression of Islamic movements to the proposed models of some Muslim countries, prompted an intellectual reform among moderate Islamist leaders. The hard core of their strategy, inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood, i.e. a bottom-up Islamization of the society, has remained intact and is enforced through carrying out public services and charity. Nonetheless, in the case of government, they take it as a belief, not a tactic, that promotion of an Islamic society does not dictate establishing an Islamic governmental framework: if the people are provided with justice, freedom and welfare, not only are considerable steps taken towards making society and government religious, but this also will be the best way to make the government Islamic. In his interviews before returning to Tunisia, Rachid Ghannouchi made that explicit: “We learned seeking justice from Imam Khomeini and the Islamic Revolution of Iran… Now we understand it is possible to provide the most conducive context for religious government by having justice and freedom. So there is no insistence on establishing a religious state.” Even the most influential seat of learning in the Sunni World-- Al-Azhar University -that had announced the rallies against Husni Mubarak’s regime were religiously forbidden and refrained from entering politics- actually provided an Islamic justification of democracy (equating it with bay’ah or an ‘oath of allegiance’).

While it may appear as an unlikely picture, Islam, government and politics will have a peaceful coexistence in the future system of Tunisia. Certainly, the new constitution of Tunisia will not accept the separation of religion from politics, while it will also not be thoroughly Islamic. As a result of the Arab Spring, on the one hand, secularists had to give many privileges to the Islamists and on the other hand, the burgeoning role of Islamists implies that their future popularity depends on success in providing justice, freedom and welfare.