The Question of Political Reform in Iran

Iranian society is rapidly changing and there are numerous signs of a profound gap between the political elite aligned with the eastern bloc and the pro-west young generation yearning to enjoy the liberties associated with individual freedom unencumbered by state interventions, particularly regarding dress codes and the hijab.   This gap has been interpreted as alarming according to some top government officials, who seek a stricter enforcement of hijab codes and the like, in order to sway the young Iranians toward greater "morality."

But, by all accounts, this is the wrong prescription and Iran should move in the direction of expanding the political space and political reform, similar to neighboring Turkey, instead of taking its cues from the closed polities of neighboring Arab states, with the exception of Iraq, which enjoys a more pluralistic system than Iran.  Of course, there is a great deal of resistance to change, which might undermine the ruling elite's privileges, but it is necessary and impossible to avoid.  This means, first and foremost, more competitive elections, decentralization of authority, and the mushrooming of political parties and civil society organizations, which would then translate into a more representative parliament than has been the case so far.  Case in point, a new environmentalist coalition -- call it a new green movement -- winning seats in Majlis elections is conceivable, focusing on not just the burning environmental issues but also gender equality.  In turn, the old restrictions and ossified criteria of candidate selection need to be overhauled in favor of liberal standards that promote diversity and genuine choices, not those selected by filtering committees that habitually disqualify candidates based on narrow ideological parameters. 

A sine qua non of genuine political reform is the reform of the opposition groups themselves, to rid themselves of authoritarian and exclusionary norms and demeanor, often mirroring the elites they oppose, prioritizing tolerance and right to criticize, as well as the need for moral means in order to achieve their noble ends. The Machiavellian resort to bad means for the sake of good ends has, historically, backfired not only in Iran but also in the rest of the world, particularly within the Eastern Bloc.  Thus, what Iran needs is a double reform, that is, reform from the top coinciding with and complemented by a reform from below, by the aspiring groups of citizens who want to have direct input into politics and reshape it according to modern and liberal standards. 

A word of caution here, however.  Iran's ethnic mosaic is still mired in the problems of insufficient national integration, hierarchy, provincialism, ethnic bias, and even irredentism, all of which put certain limits on the country's democratization, insofar as the latter might risk opening an ethnic Pandora's Box, requiring keen attention to the national security side effects of such democratization.  Inevitably, political reform and national security considerations must move in tandem, otherwise the former ends up in the snares of its contradictions.  On the other hand, the absence of reform and a real push to close the growing gap between the civil society and the state can only yield more and not less national security headache. Caught between the Scylla of needed reform and the Charybdis of national security syndrome, Iran's ruling elite must opt for a fine balancing act that safeguards both objectives, instead of sacrificing one for the other.   After all, Iranians can draw on their own historical experience here, how the Shah's resistance to political reform culminated in a volcanic revolution.  Ultimately, it will be a question of political reform or another revolution in Iran.