The Mystery of Tehran’s Response
Why has Tehran ignored the IAEA deadline? By Mina Ali-Eslam
It may be too soon to predict, and we are not sure whether Tehran wants to transfer its uranium stockpile to Western countries or buy the enriched material, but as informed officials, including Ali Asghar Soltanieh, Iran’s permanent ambassador to IAEA have reported of the proceedings in Vienna, Tehran has become cognizant about the significant difference of exporting all or five percent of its uranium stockpile and while disagreeing with the other side over the portion of the material it should hand, prefers to keep the uranium stock and continue enrichment inside the country.
In the interval between Geneva and Vienna talks, Iranian officials never ceased to highlight the capability and continuation of domestic uranium enrichment. The level of this enrichment varied however, from sixty-three to twenty percent. Soltanieh is also one of the officials talking of in-house enrichment, that is, instead of transferring the material to Russia, Tehran will handle the process itself. Thus, the only problem will be how to convert the twenty-percent-enriched uranium into nuclear fuel.
Tehran has not officially announced either its intention to continue domestic enrichment or transfer the uranium stockpile to another country; however, its emphasis on the enrichment capacity may be both a diplomatic maneuver to advance its goals or a plan Iranian officials are actually harboring.
Iran has ignored the Friday deadline set by IAEA, keeping Russia, France and the United States waiting until the next week. That may be an attempt to create a situation in which an unanticipated response would not shock the powers. IAEA inspectors’ visit from the uranium enrichment plant near Qom may be a prelude to Iran’s decision. However, it is clear that the United States, France, Russia and IAEA are not willing to focus on anything other than Iran’s positive response, or to start talking on a new nuclear proposal. They believe that the draft agreement prepared by IAEA is a solid ground for a new round of trilateral cooperation between Iran, West and the International Atomic Energy Organization. The response, whatever it is, will put it in an uncharted situation.
Many political observers believe that the double talks of Geneva and Vienna were so fruitful that not only they worried Iran’s regional competitors, but also cheered up West and IAEA, such that they have consented to give Tehran more time to examine and announce its decision on the draft agreement. Iran has even announced that no deadline has been set by IAEA for its response. Though reflected only by domestic media, Tehran’s claim is not far from reality. For the other side of negotiation, the only important thing is to reach a satisfactory deal, even if it means further patience, conciliatory gestures and cooperation.
Nevertheless, Tehran’s overdue response has raised the curiosity of the commentators. Some ascribe it to differences within the nuclear decision-making circle. If we assume this as true, predicting Tehran’s next week response will become a tough job.
Russians’ situation may also become awkward. If Tehran accepts the IAEA draft agreement, Russians must shoulder a crucial responsibility in nuclear dealings with Iran. And if the deal is rejected, Russians may have to rethink their support for Iran’s nuclear program. During the three-day negotiations in Vienna, Iran put forth another proposal according to which Tehran and Moscow would initiate their cooperation on uranium transfer, while Russia would carry out the process of negotiating with a third party to convert Iran’s enriched uranium into nuclear fuel. Tehran-Moscow talks on the issue were considered fruitful according to Soltanieh. Russia’s key role was also acknowledged in the draft prepared by the United States which was the base of IAEA draft agreement. Meanwhile, Moscow has demonstrated the foremost support for Iran’s nuclear program which -despite all its merits for the Russians- has provided it with a distinguished position among the negotiating parties.
The situation is ripe for cooperation and removal of all misunderstandings and nuclear talks can function as a base for further constructive collaboration. Every decision that throttles this process will not be a favorable item for Iran, though our national interests should be definitely taken into consideration in exporting the uranium stockpile.
In the interval between Geneva and Vienna talks, Iranian officials never ceased to highlight the capability and continuation of domestic uranium enrichment. The level of this enrichment varied however, from sixty-three to twenty percent. Soltanieh is also one of the officials talking of in-house enrichment, that is, instead of transferring the material to Russia, Tehran will handle the process itself. Thus, the only problem will be how to convert the twenty-percent-enriched uranium into nuclear fuel.
Tehran has not officially announced either its intention to continue domestic enrichment or transfer the uranium stockpile to another country; however, its emphasis on the enrichment capacity may be both a diplomatic maneuver to advance its goals or a plan Iranian officials are actually harboring.
Iran has ignored the Friday deadline set by IAEA, keeping Russia, France and the United States waiting until the next week. That may be an attempt to create a situation in which an unanticipated response would not shock the powers. IAEA inspectors’ visit from the uranium enrichment plant near Qom may be a prelude to Iran’s decision. However, it is clear that the United States, France, Russia and IAEA are not willing to focus on anything other than Iran’s positive response, or to start talking on a new nuclear proposal. They believe that the draft agreement prepared by IAEA is a solid ground for a new round of trilateral cooperation between Iran, West and the International Atomic Energy Organization. The response, whatever it is, will put it in an uncharted situation.
Many political observers believe that the double talks of Geneva and Vienna were so fruitful that not only they worried Iran’s regional competitors, but also cheered up West and IAEA, such that they have consented to give Tehran more time to examine and announce its decision on the draft agreement. Iran has even announced that no deadline has been set by IAEA for its response. Though reflected only by domestic media, Tehran’s claim is not far from reality. For the other side of negotiation, the only important thing is to reach a satisfactory deal, even if it means further patience, conciliatory gestures and cooperation.
Nevertheless, Tehran’s overdue response has raised the curiosity of the commentators. Some ascribe it to differences within the nuclear decision-making circle. If we assume this as true, predicting Tehran’s next week response will become a tough job.
Russians’ situation may also become awkward. If Tehran accepts the IAEA draft agreement, Russians must shoulder a crucial responsibility in nuclear dealings with Iran. And if the deal is rejected, Russians may have to rethink their support for Iran’s nuclear program. During the three-day negotiations in Vienna, Iran put forth another proposal according to which Tehran and Moscow would initiate their cooperation on uranium transfer, while Russia would carry out the process of negotiating with a third party to convert Iran’s enriched uranium into nuclear fuel. Tehran-Moscow talks on the issue were considered fruitful according to Soltanieh. Russia’s key role was also acknowledged in the draft prepared by the United States which was the base of IAEA draft agreement. Meanwhile, Moscow has demonstrated the foremost support for Iran’s nuclear program which -despite all its merits for the Russians- has provided it with a distinguished position among the negotiating parties.
The situation is ripe for cooperation and removal of all misunderstandings and nuclear talks can function as a base for further constructive collaboration. Every decision that throttles this process will not be a favorable item for Iran, though our national interests should be definitely taken into consideration in exporting the uranium stockpile.