Not All That Glistens Is Gold
IRD: For many, the seizure of the UK embassy in Tehran invoked the memory of the Islamist students –the Followers of Imam Khomeini’s Path- takeover of the US embassy in Tehran in 1979, an act whose effects still linger in Iran-US relations after thirty-two years. IRD interviewed Masoumeh Ebtekar, speaker of the group who invaded the embassy and an incumbent member of the Tehran City Council, on the differences and similarities of the two incidents:
IRD: The seizures of the UK and US embassies has been a constant topic for comparison during recent days. What differences and similarities do you see between these two incidents?
ME: More than formal similarities, it is the historical context that matters. It is simple-minded to compare the events due to their formal similarities and not their nature. The circumstances which led to the 13th of Aban, 1358 (4th of November, 1979) are the clue to differentiate these two. In my analysis of the world’s situation, there is no doubt that the UK and the US had a decisive role, both before or after the Revolution, especially in the event of the 28th of Mordad [the CIA-backed coup against Dr. Mosaddeq], in spoiling the Iranian people’s rights and interests. Analyzing the event realistically in order to face the problems is not in contradiction with criticizing seriously the behavior of these two states.
The event of the 13th of Aban occurred only a few months after the revolution in an atmosphere full of revolutionary zeal: the Islamist students of those days were not optimistic about the official bodies, whether the intelligence services and security apparatus or the diplomatic body, in resolving the issues and establishing a basis for a newly-born revolution. At that time, no governmental structure had been established, the republic’s essence, I mean the Constitution, had not been approved, the Experts’ Assembly had just been formed and was drafting the Constitution, no president was elected, the provisional government [of Mahdi Bazargan] and the Council of Revolution had been ruling the country and there was no parliament. So up until the 13th of Aban, none of the structural necessities of a democratic political system were existent. In such an atmosphere, the students thought that if there were a serious plot for overthrowing the Islamic Republic system through the use of domestic and foreign agents, like Operation Ajax in 1953, it could irrecoverably damage the nascent system.
Knowing the history of revolutions in other countries and the damages inflicted on them by imperialism, the students came to this point that there was no reaction expected form the official structures, the provisional government was in a phase of weakness due to successive resignations and the US had not officially recognized the Islamic Republic, as it had received the Shah on its soil. Other issues intensified instability in the country, such as the instigating of ethnic tensions. This analysis convinced the students that they had to take measures; in fact, it was the weakness of the central government that prompted the students to make this decision.
The students did not publicize any information about their plan; that is why no reporter was present at the scene. There is only one video recording and some photos taken by the students. There was no broadcasting, presence of official reporters, advance warnings etc., since it was a truly spontaneous measure; they even decided not to inform Imam Khomeini, because they believed if he found out, it would turn into a state liability, while the plan was deeply based on people power-- not any of the disciplinary or security forces knew about the plan. Even the two policemen protecting of the US embassy were taken off-guard.
IRD: You mentioned the differences. If you were a student now, wouldn’t you do the same thing as the students did last Tuesday, considering the current social, state and international circumstances?
ME: Now we have a stabilized central government and a parliament; so the feedback and the consequences of the issue will be different. The only justification for what the students did in 1979 was their consciousness about events such as the 28th of Mordad and its restive situation. Some months after the takeover, the Nojeh Coup took place, so the measure adopted by the students was largely a preventive action, as they knew how likely it was that the US would organize a coup against Iran. It is interesting that when we talk to foreign analysts, they acknowledge that the US’ history of intervention makes the students’ measure understandable.
IRD: Is the same true about the UK?
ME: No, it is not. In those days, the US was overtly challenging Iran. The Shah’s admission to the United States could lead to another Ajax-type operation, while the UK’s conduct had always been a minor concern. The students marched towards the US embassy without any reporters following them [unlike the Tuesday seizure of the British Embassy], without carrying any Molotov cocktails or throwing any stones. They had only been carrying pairs of pliers under the chador of one of the ladies to break the lock. They entered the embassy and immediately closed the door, without provoking any disorder or disturbance. The plan was to enter the embassy along with chanting slogans. The name the students chose for themselves, namely the Muslim Students’ Following the Path of Imam, was intentionally used to prevent any party from abusing the movement. They had also been very sensitive about the documents, as they were considered as national resources. Not even one paper was left unattended; all of them were organized and preserved by a special team. Not even one glass was broken during the seizure; that was not our target, but what we sought was to stifle a secret move attempting to undermine the Islamic Republic of Iran. The measure can be certainly criticized, but as its target was to prevent a coup, what it successfully carried out should be regarded as acceptable. Apart from all the expenses the move imposed upon the country, especially the aftermath unacceptable for a large number of the students involved (such as prolongation of the hostage-keeping), the measure took place since there were no chances for negotiations. If there had been any alternatives, the takeover would not have happened.
The move was supported by Imam Khomeini in the initial hours after the event. Some have claimed that Imam did not initially agree with what the students did; but as I have asked this from the source of the news, Mr. Mousavi Khoeiniha, when the operation started at 10 AM and was accomplished at 12, during the noon prayers, Mr. Khoeiniha had asked the Imam’s son Ahmad Khomeini about the event. He had asked who the students were and Ahmad Khomeini had responded that they were well-known students not dependent on any political group [and Ayatollah Khomeini approved of the seizure consequently.]
IRD: As you said, there was a history to the US’ role in Iran which provoked concern. As to the Tuesday takeover of the UK embassy, many say the same thing; that there has been a historical anti-UK sentiment among the people which instigated the measure. Is it not the same?
ME: No, they are very different. Now we have an established central government and political structure. In addition, the nature of ties between Iran and the US were very different at that time: a revolution had taken place and there were some worries that the revolution could be curtailed by the US in the same way. Currently, we do not face the shadow of a coup. There are some threats and I don’t deny that, but not exclusively from the UK, but also from several other countries. One with a sound understanding of international relations would ask what trend was the Tuesday seizure supposed to preclude? The occupation of the US embassy cut the chain of the events probably leading to a coup. What chains have been broken now?
IRD: The result of the US embassy takeover was the resignation of the interim government. At least the students did not believe that the government could halt the coup. Is there such a worry now?
ME: The parliament had already addressed the issue [by passing a bill to downgrade ties with London]; so had other powers. The government has never announced that it is aligned with the UK or against anti-London initiatives. The common belief then was that the takeover would force Bazargan’s government to react, especially after Imam Khomeini’s support. Calling the UK Embassy seizure [imitating Ayatollah Khomeini’s dubbing the US Embassy seizure ‘the Second Revolution’] rings hollow. Imam Khomeini would certainly express his opposition if he did not agree with the seizure. These simulations cannot cast doubt on historical events. Their only product is erosion of the trust the people have in their history. It would be simple-minded to consider both movements of the same nature.