Army’s Role in Politics, from Turkey to Egypt
A century of waiting is a long time for a dream to become a reality. Mohammad Morsi’s victory in the 2012 Egyptian election was the achievement of a dream for which the Muslim Brotherhood had paid a high price. Today, if this dream is not gone with the wind, it has distanced itself from an influential nostalgia like the past.
It seems that the spiritual implications of Morsi’s downfall are much heavier than the other dimensions of the impacts of this important development. Morsi’s downfall came after a 48-hour ultimatum and with a modern coup so as to remind not only Morsi but all political leaders of the world, especially in the Middle East, that the domain of politics is not the domain of authoritarianism, individualism, and moving on a black-and-white path, but rather one of acting in the gray area.
Morsi had forgotten that he had only 52% of the people’s votes and the 48% who didn’t vote for him were also Egyptians. His reliance on the constitution, which gained 67% of the 33% that participated, could not have been a legitimate look.
Morsi did not pay attention to the fact that on the ground the success of the political theory of the Muslim Brotherhood depends on economic success and economic failure is the introduction to political failure. Not only did he not listen to people’s concerns for freedom but he also did not pay attention to the people’s concern for food which was their immediate need.
A century-long waiting period for the success of an ideology is very long. Morsi’s co-thinkers in Turkey understood this fact and that is why they succeeded in dominating all political crises with a successful economy. Predictions also indicate that they will succeed in Turkey’s upcoming elections.
Although one year is a short time to evaluate Morsi’s performance, he has not presented a good record, neither in domestic politics nor in foreign policy.
The economy, which was still involved with bribery and corruption, not only did not reduce the unemployment and inflation rates, but it also failed to solve smaller issues such as the cutting off of electricity and providing bread and fuel. Morsi’s weak management seriously damaged the tourism industry and agriculture as the backbone of economy.
The elite society of Egypt, which al-Azhar is a symbol of, was not compatible with the Salafi-Takfiri ideology and since long Egypt, contrary to Saudi Arabia, was the manifestation of religious tolerance and the survival of the Coptics was its result. Instead of being the symbol for national reconciliation, Morsi prepared the ground for Jihad and supported the strengthened Salafi movement. Morsi confined himself, Egypt, and the tolerant Muslim Brotherhood members to his closed religious outlook, the result of which was the killings of Coptics and Shiites.
Many have condemned the army’s entrance into disputes between Morsi’s supporters and opponents and have stated that there is no good or bad coup and called the army’s intervention an example of a coup. Coups are not acceptable in the views of the freedom-seekers and those who pursue development and those who have remained silent with regard to the Egyptian coup are aware of this fact. But Egypt has its own specific conditions where the solution to a political deadlock is not an election but the army.
Those who are familiar with the local conditions of Egypt know that if Egypt, considering its religious, ethnic, and political diversity, was entrapped in bipolar conflicts, the threat of civil war could bear heavy and irreparable damages on this country. The army’s entrance, as a powerful and organized institution, was in charge of safeguarding order and security and their intervention can be analyzed from this perspective. It is true that there is no deadlock in democracies and holding elections is the solution, but neither did Morsi show willingness in this regard nor did his opponents reiterate this path. Democracy is a new-born phenomenon in Egypt. Everyone knows that democracy is the outcome of a long process and Egypt, which has recently been acquainted with the concept of democracy, has a long way to go until its institutionalization.
Of course, the threat of the army’s measure is the replacement of ballot boxes with on-the-ground pressure. In the logic of politics and governance, street-based shows of power must not lead to change in political power. If this method becomes a trend, then Egypt will never see peace and stability. In order to move towards democracy, Egypt must institutionalize the efficient tools of democracy.
In countries like Egypt, Turkey, South Korea,… the army does not only enjoy a national and acceptable status, but it is also a development-seeking institution and their historic actions have been one of the important factors of people’s familiarity with modernity and its manifestations. The popularity of Egypt’s army is the result of three national-Arab wars with the Zionist regime and its development-seeking position in the Egyptian society. Nasser’s status, as the national hero and founder of the new Egypt, is the manifestation of the historic position of the military in the power structure of this country. The Egyptian military has acted very intelligently and professionally during the past three years and despite the fact that they acted in the shadow in these developments, it still remained the most significant factor in the power equations by redefining its role and comprehending the domestic and foreign equations. Of course, there is no doubt that the Egyptian army, besides macro-political and security considerations for the people of Egypt, considers economic benefits for this institution. The point is that the political institution in Egypt does not enjoy the capacity of the institution of the army and needs time to reach that point. The process of political maturity and development has been passed in Turkey and today, with the institutionalization of the parties and the support of the international system for the trend of transfer of power from the military to the politicians in Turkey, the army has been downgraded from a position at the top of the pyramid to a position of receiving orders. Egypt needs a long time to replace the military institution with a political institution.
In foreign policy, Morsi not only approved the Camp David Accords and exported gas to the Zionist regime, but also stood alongside Qatar and Turkey and practically against the resistance front in the crisis in Syria. The triangle of Egypt, Qatar, and Turkey played an important role in exerting pressure on the resistance front. Egypt played the role of spiritual supporter for the Takfiri Salafis through the fatwas of Salafi sheikhs, Qatar financially supported them and Turkey gave its military and political support and together they played a logistic role not only in weakening Damascus but also in strengthening the Salafi groups and this became a matter of concern for the West. Some believe that there is a relation between the protests in Turkey with Gezi Park as an excuse and the developments in Qatar and in Egypt, and the international system has intended to punish and manage the behavior of these three countries with regard to the Takfiri groups.
Morsi’s strategic mistake in its view of the world of Islam was being entrapped in the concept of the Shiite crescent, which was due to his religious outlook. Morsi was ignorant of the fact that the Shiite crescent is located in the circle of the Sunnis and Iran, as its symbol, has paid and is paying the highest costs for Sunni Palestine and Hamas. Despite positive signs from Iran, Morsi’s biased outlook caused this Muslim Brotherhood president to have cold relations with Iran and be distant from Iraq and Hezbollah.
Morsi’s closed religious viewpoint was the cause of challenges with Syria, distant relations with Iran, and preferring the Zionist enemy, which dealt heavy blows not only to him and the Muslim Brotherhood but also to the ideology which was the achievement of a dream. The Muslim Brotherhood gained power in unfavorable conditions, without readiness, without leadership and with a weak performance and it will be left on the sidelines for years. The prudent role played by the domestic and foreign elements in this trend should be studied and learnt from. Today, in Egypt, a dream is dying that, even if resuscitated through artificial breathing, will never be the same dream again.